Negative Economic Shocks and the Compliance to Social Norms

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Abstract

We study why suffering a Negative Economic Shock (NES), i.e. a significant loss, may trigger a change in behavior. We conjecture that people trade off concern for money with a conditional preference to follow social norms, and that suffering a shock makes extrinsic motivation more salient, leading to more norm violation. We study this question experimentally: After administering losses on the earnings from a Real Effort Task, we analyze choices in a set of prosocial and antisocial settings. To derive our predictions, we elicit social norms separately from behavior. We find robust evidence that shock increases deviations from norms. However, when losses are perpetrated, victims of intentional losses appear sensitive to in-group bias and more reactive to lack of trustworthiness in a trust game. This is consistent with traumatic event leading to a tighter mindset.

Keywords: Negative Economic Shocks; Social Norms; Norm compliance; Anti Social Behavior; Cooperation; Trust; Trustworthiness.

JEL Codes: C91; C92; D90; D91.

1 Introduction

A Negative Economic Shock (an NES from now on) is a large financial loss on earnings or accumulated assets. Shocks can be due to psychosocial stressors (divorce, job loss, injury) or traumatic events (violence, disasters). Shocks have been studied to understand the impact of poverty (Mani et al., 2013; Haushofer and Fehr, 2014; Carvalho et al., 2016): the comparison of the rich and the poor is confounded by environmental and individual factors, whereas shocks are a plausible source of variation or can be manipulated in the lab. Scholars have researched shocks to understand how scarcity, war, and natural disasters have shaped cultural and psychological evolution (Gelfand et al., 2017; Heinrich, 2020; Prediger et al., 2014; Aksoy and Palma, 2019).

This paper investigates why suffering an NES can lead to behavioral change. We conjecture that decision-makers (DMs) trade off money and a compliance to social norms (Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2018; Krupka and Weber, 2013; Bicchieri, 2006; List et al., 2004). Social norms are rules of behavior that are contingent and for which a subject has a preference to conform, conditional on the expectation that most of the reference group follows in kind, and think it ought to be done (Bicchieri, 2006). Following social norms is costly: Punishing transgressors, avoiding cheating, and abstaining from free riding involve carrying out a cost. If the decision-maker trades off the concern for money and the conditional preference to follow the social norm, she will face an increasing marginal cost of norm compliance when experiencing an NES, leading to more norm violations.

We derive this prediction from a behavioural model. Assuming that norms enter the utility function and participants are heterogeneous in their psychological cost of compliance, we analyze optimal behavior in several binary decision problems where a substantive norm applies, considering both anti-social and pro-social tasks. In all these settings, participants should decide whether to harm their counterpart. Sometimes this action is *prescribed* by the norm, as in punishment and retaliation. Sometimes this action is *proscribed* by the norm, as in cheating or cooperation. The model predicts that we should observe more norm violations after experiencing a shock. We design three experiments, to assess this prediction. The critical design choice is to manipulate NES by inducing significant losses (80%) on the earnings from a Real Effort Task (Bogliacino and Montealegre, 2020). After this initial stage, participants interact in one (or multiple) tasks, where we measure the change in norm compliance. The settings include stealing, cheating, Joy of Destruction (JoD), and cooperation.

Since the predictions are conditional on social norms, we elicit the normative expectations that hold for each situation using Bicchieri and Xiao (2009)'s methodology: participants provide their personal normative beliefs (PNBs) over the action space of the decision-maker and then are asked to guess the modal response to the PNBs (under a simple incentive scheme). Participants did not make an actual choice in these settings, to make sure that we elicit social norms separately from behavior (Krupka and Weber, 2013).

As predicted, subjects steal more and cheat more after suffering an NES. The increase in stealing is almost one fourth of a standard deviation (calculated on the outcome variable in the control). In the die-under-the-cup task (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013), where participants are paid according to the number that they *report* from the throw of a dice, they are 14% more likely to report four and five, the number with the highest payoff. The effect is equivalent to more than one-fourth of a sd. When we look at the JoD, the *decrease* in retaliation is as large as 50% of a sd, again supporting the prediction of the model. In the prisoner's dilemma, an NES increases defection, without reaching significance at the conventional levels.

The main theoretical claim matches a number of stylized facts. The fact that NES may generate antisocial behavior, in particular crimes against property, has not gone unnoticed. Compelling quasi-experimental evidence document a positive relationship between negative economic shocks and antisocial behavior. For example, Dube and Vargas (2013) use the change in coffee prices to study variations in crime in communities that are highly dependent on income from the harvest. Cortés et al. (2016) use the collapse of the Ponzi scheme in Colombia to detect variation in a portfolio of criminal activities. Bignon et al. (2017) exploit the regional variation in the exposure to phylloxera in wine-producing regions in France to identify the increase in property crime. Dix-Carneiro et al. (2018) use the trade liberalization shock in Brazil to estimate the causal impact of the shock on criminal activity. Weather shocks have also led to an increase in property crimes (Mehlum et al., 2006). Cheating has been less studied. Aksoy and Palma (2019) look at cheating under "scarcity" - the shock around paycheck variation - but could not detect any significant variation. Bogliacino and Montealegre (2020) also look at the effect of NES in the die-under-the-cup task, finding no effect, but the presence of four tasks may have diluted the incentives. In a recent paper, the manipulation of NES correlates with disproportionate predatory behavior (Blanco et al., 2021). Since the authors manipulate shocks and criteria of assignment of social status, their evidence suggests that circumstances favor antisocial instincts. Additionally, Boonmanunt et al. (2020) document that people under scarcity are less responsive to a social norm intervention, in line with our main argument.

Our theoretical framework also outperformed other theories. In the JoD, the norm of retaliation generates a trade off between compliance and income (money burning is costly). Although grounded on the same reasoning as in stealing and cheating, the model predicts *less* antisocial activity, and is consistent with our controlled evidence. Theories of crime like strain theory (Merton, 1938) cannot predict this finding. Strain theory states that the frustration caused by NES should increase all antisocial behavior (stealing *and* money burning).

To document the robustness of our argument on shocks and norm compliance, we conducted a further experiment, where (a) we impose a rule instead of relying on an elicited norm, (b) we separately controlled for the wealth effect, and (c) we used fully unexpected shocks. We found that the effect of an NES over norm compliance is robust and distinguishable from a pure wealth effect.

Since shocks can be the result of trauma, we conducted an additional experiment where we compare random and intentional shocks. In a trust game, we added a third treatment to the random shock and the control: participants are randomly matched with someone who deliberately decided to rob them. This treatment provides an abstract setting to study violence.

The first result is that the victims of intentional shocks are more prone to in-group bias: they are sensible and react upon the belief that the counterpart has been shocked, in a way that is not present either in random shock or the control. Second, participants are more sensible to lack of trustworthiness, reacting tighter.

The latter result is consistent with the argument that tight culture is the product of repeated exposure to shocks (Gelfand et al., 2017; Gelfand, 2012; Gelfand et al., 2011, 2012). It is also largely consistent with the evidence with Prediger et al. (2014), documenting a positive money burning effect of long term exposure to scarcity.

Our result on in group bias aligns with studies of social preferences during violence, natural disasters, the pandemic, and other major shocks, claiming an increase in other regarding concern (Adger et al., 2005; Cassar et al., 2017; Bauer et al., 2016; Bogliacino et al., 2020, 2021; Botchway and Filippin, 2021).[1] Controlled evidence on the effect of shocks is provided by Bejarano et al. (2021, 2018). They found that shocks on the endowment in a trust game affect behavior but in a way that is in line with assigning different endowments from the very start. Since they administer NES on the endowment in the stage game and not on the initial asset position separately from the main interaction (as in our setting), we think that inequality becomes very salient. In fact, their results are in line with a prediction from a variation of an inequality aversion model (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).

We now move to present the theoretical predictions and the experimental evidence. Formal proofs are reported in an Appendix and the experimental protocols in the Supplementary Online Materials (SOM).

2 The model

In this section, we study the problem of a decision-maker (DM) facing a binary choice involving a social norm. We derive a set of predictions on the effect of an NES - modelled as a reduction in the DM's asset position - in a series of standard experimental tasks. The DM derives utility from income, including assets and the monetary payoff from her choices, but has a conditional preference to follow social norms: acting in violation of a norm results in a psychological cost. DMs are indexed by their norm propensity θ, to capture heterogeneity in norm compliance. The preferences are similar to Krupka and Weber (2013), Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2018), and Levitt and List (2007). Models of social image have a similar framework, but social image is endogenous (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Benabou and Tirole, 2006).

2.1 The optimal choice

Formally, a DM (i) should choose $d_i \in \{0, 1\}$. If the setting is strategic, she will be interacting with j. By convention, $d = 1$ is the harmful action, defined as the action that causes the counterpart a loss or prevents her from enjoying a gain. Preferences include two terms. The

[1] An exception in the context of Covid19 is Aycinena and Blanco (2021), where exposure - but not the realization - of shocks reduces trust.

first is the utility of income: an additive separable utility function $u(e+w(d_i,d_j))$, where $w(\cdot)$ is the monetary payoff, and e is the initial endowment. The second term is $\mathbb{1}_{d_i \neq n} c(\theta)$, the psychological cost of deviating from a social norm n. The cost increases in θ, the propensity to comply. We have $\theta \in [0,1]$, with Cumulative Density Function $F(\cdot)$.

In some situations, $d = 1$ transgresses a social norm (i.e. $n = 0$), as in stealing, in others, it is prescribed by the norm ($n = 1$), as in punishment. If the norm is conditional, as in tit-for-tat, we will use the notation $n = d_j$.

An NES is modelled as $de < 0$.

The following assumptions hold:

Assumption 1. $u(\cdot) : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$

$u'(\cdot) > 0$

$u''(\cdot) < 0$

Assumption 2. $c(\cdot) : [0,1] \to \mathbb{R}$

$c'(\theta) > 0, \; c''(\theta) > 0$

Assumption 1 is the standard decreasing marginal utility of income. Assumption 2 formalizes the utility cost of norm violation and the dependence on the psychological parameter θ.

To understand the logic of the argument, consider a non strategic choice where a fairness norm is in place ($n = 0$) and $d = 1$ is a transgression. An agent of parameter θ chooses $d = 1$ if $u(e+w(1)) - u(e+w(0)) \geqslant c(\theta)$. The term $u(e+w(1)) - u(e+w(0))$ captures the benefit B of transgressing the norm, constant across agents. The cost is increasing in θ. In Figure 1, top panel, we plot the optimal choice as a function of θ: there is a threshold $\bar{\theta} = \theta_1$ below which agents will transgress, and above which they will comply.

What happens when a DM suffers an NES? Due to the concavity of the utility function, the marginal utility of transgression increases, leading to more norm violation. In the top panel of Figure 1, for the new benefit curve, more people choose to carry out $d = 1$, i.e. $\bar{\theta}$ moves to the right, from θ_1 to θ_2.

Consider also the opposite situation where $d = 1$ is costly and recommended by the norm (i.e.

$n = 1$). An agent of parameter θ chooses $d = 1$ if: $u(e + w(1)) - u(e + w(0)) \geqslant -c(\theta)$. The left-hand side is the utility loss from punishment and the right-hand side the utility cost of norm violation. In presence of an NES, concavity implies that $\frac{\partial u(e+w(1))-u(e+w(0))}{\partial e} > 0$, the utility loss from following the norm increases and less people will choose $d = 1$. This is illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 1.

In settings with interaction, we need to introduce strategic uncertainty: the DM will now maximizes $E[u(e + w(d_i, d_j)) - \mathbb{1}_{d_i \neq n} c(\theta)]$. Define p to be the expected likelihood that d_j chooses 1. There are three cases, either $n = 0$, $n = 1$, or $n = p$ (the latter is tit-for-tat). We can write the expression in a compact form as $p(u(e+w(1,1)) - u(e+w(0,1))) + (1-p)(u(e+w(1,0)) - u(e+w(0,0)))) \geq (1-2n)c(\theta)$.

Consider when the norm is tit-for-tat. The DM chooses 1 if $p(u(e+w(1,1)) - u(e+w(0,1))) + (1-p)(u(e+w(1,0)) - u(e+w(0,0)))) \geq (1-2p)c(\theta)$. There are three terms: $u(e+w(1,1)) - u(e+w(0,1))$ is the utility loss from retaliation, $u(e+w(1,0)) - u(e+w(0,0))$ is the benefit of defection, and $(1-2p)c(\theta)$ is the (expected) psychological cost.

We will derive our predictions in the two extreme cases, $p = 0$ and $p = 1$. These predictions are testable, once beliefs are elicited in an experiment. Guessing on what the counterpart is going to do is also a plausible description of decision-making a one shot interaction. In the Appendix, we will show that the conclusions are supported in equilibrium by a formal comparative statics result.

Under $p = 1$, there is a cost of retaliation if $u(e+w(0,1)) - u(e+w(1,1)) > 0$. When it happens, the DM chooses $d = 1$ only if the cost of transgression is larger than the cost of retaliation. Since an NES raises the cost of retaliation, the share of DMs who chooses $d = 1$ decreases. If retaliation is not costly, everybody will make the same choice, regardless of the shock.

Under $p = 0$, there is a benefit from defection if $u(e+w(1,0)) - u(e+w(0,0)) > 0$. The optimal choice is determined by $u(e+w(1,0)) - u(e+w(0,0)) \geq c(\theta)$. Since an NES increases the benefit from defection, the share of DM who chooses $d = 1$ increases. If defection is not profitable, everybody will comply, regardless of the shock.

The reasoning for $n = 0$ and $n = 1$ are special cases of the tit-for-tat.



Figure 1: The optimal choice

2.2 Settings

We will consider four settings: cheating, stealing, Joy of Destruction (JoD), and cooperation in prisoner's dilemma (PD).

In the cheating and stealing task, the payoffs for the DM are $w(1) > w(0)$ and the norm is $n = 0$.

The JoD is a simultaneous interaction where $d = 1$ is costly and harmful. $d = 1$ is called money burning. In the standard calibration (Abbink and Herrmann, 2011), the initial endowment is 10, the cost of burning is 1 and the damage inflicted is 5. More generally, it must hold that $w(0,0) > w(1,0) > w(0,1) > w(1,1)$. The social norm is to *retaliate* (Abbink and Herrmann, 2011).

The prisoner's dilemma is a symmetric simultaneous game where $w(1,0) > w(0,0) > w(1,1) > w(0,1)$. We assume that the relevant social norm is conditional cooperation (Gachter, 2007).

2.3 Theoretical Predictions

As discussed in Section 2.1, when there is a trade off between income and norm compliance, an NES makes people more attentive to income leading to more transgression. For a trade off to exist, following the norm should be costly in terms of payoff. This is the case for cheating, stealing and trustworthiness, where the cost of following the norm is the loss of income from $d = 1$.

For the JoD, the trade off exists when a DM expects the counterpart to burn, because burning is costly but the retaliation is prescribed by the norm. The prisoners' dilemma has a clear trade-offs: under tit-for-tat, conditional cooperation is costly because defection is profitable. An NES generates more norm violation.

The predictions are summarized in Table 1 below. A formal discussion is in the AppendixA.

2.4 Equilibrium and Comparative Statics: general results

Table 1 presents the predictions under $p = 0$ or $p = 1$. These are testable given the elicitation procedure used in the lab experiments and plausible as a description of how a DM interacts in

Setting	Social Norm	Prediction
Stealing	Do Not Steal	$S(NES) > S(C)$
Cheating	Do Not Cheat	$C(NES) > C(C)$
Money Burning	Retaliation	$D(NES) < D(C) \| P = 1$
PD	Tit-for-Tat	$C(NES) < C(C) \| P(C) = 1$

Table 1: Theoretical predictions from the norm compliance model.

a one shot decision. It is also a formal equilibrium prediction if θ_j belongs to i's information set.

Alternatively, Assumption 3 states that the distribution $F(\cdot)$ of the norm propensity parameter is common knowledge. We can show that the direction of the effect of the shock is maintained.

Assumption 3. *$F(\theta)$ is common knowledge.*

This is the definition of equilibrium:

Definition 1. *Given a symmetric simultaneous 2X2 game, with preferences $u(e + w(d_i, d_j)) - c(d_i, \theta)$, with randomly drawn players i, j, finite payoffs functions $w(d_i, d_j)$, an equilibrium with social norm n is a distribution of choices for the population such that each DM maximizes her utility and expectations are mutually consistent.*

We apply the refinement that the equilibrium be stable. Here, stability means that small perturbations induce incentives that drives behavior towards equilibrium.

The following proposition holds (the proof is in the Appendix 1).

Proposition 1. *Under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the following comparative statics hold in equilibrium: a) in the JoD, $\frac{\partial P(d=1)}{\partial e} > 0$; a) in the PD, $\frac{\partial P(d=1)}{\partial e} < 0$.*

2.5 Extensions

We used concavity to prove the result. Under Assumption 1, an NES is just a wealth effect. The concavity of the utility function (i.e. risk aversion) is undisputed (Camerer, 1995; Starmer, 2000). However, if it is just concavity that drives the norm compliance effect, then also poverty would increase transgression. A similar proposition is not empirically testable (rich and poor differ across multiple dimensions), but would be coherent with the dominant interpretation of shocks as a plausible variation to study the causal effect of poverty (Mani et al., 2013; Haushofer and Fehr, 2014; Boonmanunt et al., 2020).

Loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) generates a norm transgression effect for an NES, separately from a wealth effect. When we condition on the belief, the problem of the DM can be reduced to one of the two cases where $d = 1$ is either costly but recommended or profitable but forbidden. As a result, we can prove the general argument without strategic interaction. Assume *a fortiori* that the utility function is linear (risk neutrality) but with loss aversion. The problem of the DM becomes:

$$\max_{d \in \{0,\ 1\}} e' + w(d) - v^l(\max\{0, e - e' - w(d)\}) - \mathbb{1}_{d_i \neq n} c(\theta) \tag{1}$$

with $v^l(\cdot) : \mathbb{R}_+ \to \mathbb{R}_+$ and increasing, and e' is the current endowment, either equal to e, in the control, or lower than e in case of NES. In the formulation of the v^l function, e is the reference point.

In the control, the DM chooses 1 if $w(1) - w(0) \geq (1 - 2n)c(\theta)$, in presence of a (large enough) shock, and defining $\Delta e = e - e'$, if $w(1) - w(0) + v^l(\Delta e - w(0)) - v^l(\Delta e - w(1)) \geq (1 - 2n)c(\theta)$. This will lead to the same predictions as in Table 1, but without reducing an NES to a wealth effect. For instance, a positive shock would be void of consequences in this case, whereas under concavity the effect of shock would be symmetrical.

3 Eliciting social norms

The predictions are conditional on social norms. Following the definition by Bicchieri (2006), social norms should be supported by normative expectations. Normative expectations are second-order beliefs: what one expects others think should be done in a given contingency.

There are two main methods to elicit normative expectations: the coordination game by Krupka and Weber (2013) and the two steps elicitation method by Bicchieri and Xiao (2009). The former asks participants to rate the actions available to the DM in terms of moral appropriateness but pays them to match the modal response. As in any coordination game, salience drives participants' strategic choices (Mehta et al., 1994), and shared beliefs associated with norms become salient.

The two steps elicitation method by Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) recovers first-order and second-order belief. Subjects report their Personal Normative Beliefs (PNBs) for the action sets available to the DM, usually as a singleton. Then,they are paid to guess the response to the PNBs questions. As discussed and analyzed in Aycinena et al. (2021), KW and BX methods elicit the intensive and extensive margin respectively. Given our interest in carrying out an action, more than its intensity, we rely on the BX method.

We send an online invitation to a sample drawn from the subject pool at the Unbiased Lab (Universidad Nacional) to fill in an online incentivized survey (it is available in SOM, Section I). Data were gathered in February 2021.

Participants went through two parts. Part A elicited PNBs over the action space for the DM in each prosocial and antisocial task used in this article. The PNB is the "personal opinion on what is the appropriate and morally correct action of Individual A, selecting one of the following options". Each question included a description, the sample size, and the pool of participants. The sequence of questions came in random order. In total, participants evaluated six decisions, three antisocial and three prosocial. The decisions include the trust and trustworthiness choices in a trust game, which we will discuss in the second part of this paper.

After stating their PNBs, in part B, participants were asked to predict the modal action among the respondents in the original experiment (empirical expectations) and the modal response to the PNBs questions among the respondents in the current experiment (normative expectations). Empirical expectations are collected for completeness. In each question, the order of the available options was randomized. Each participant made twelve predictions, and one was randomly selected for payment at the end. A correct guess was paid 25000 COP. The show-up fee was 10000 COP. The average time of completion was 35 mins. We collected 109 observations. On average, participants earned 21000 COP (6 USD). Participants did not make decisions in the settings, and they did not participate to the experiments. This is to ensure elicitation of normative expectations separately from behavior (Krupka and Weber, 2013).[2]

These were the action sets of the decision-maker in each setting described to the participants.

[2]To avoid deception, we describe real experiments carried out in our lab. As a result, for the trust game, we use a dichotomous trust game whose data we do not report here and for the prisoner dilemma, we use as reference the experiment by Bogliacino et al. (2020).

For the stealing task, the decisions included stealing and not stealing. For the die-under-the-cup task, the action set included truthful reporting, reporting the first three numbers unconditionally, reporting four or five unconditionally, reporting six unconditionally, misreporting the drawn number plus or minus a maximum of two to own advantage, misreporting the drawn number plus or minus a maximum of two to own disadvantage. For the JoD, the possible actions were burning unconditionally, abstaining unconditionally, choosing the same action as the counterpart (tit-for-tat), and choosing the opposite action of the counterpart. For the trust (cooperation) game, similarly to the JoD, the possible actions were trusting (cooperating) unconditionally, keeping (defecting) unconditionally, choosing the same action as the counterpart, and choosing the opposite action of the counterpart. For trustworthiness, the two available actions were sharing or keeping. In all cases, we use the same framing used in the original experiment to avoid furthering experimenter demand.

We show the elicited normative expectations in Figure 2. For the stealing task (Panel A), Do Not Steal was the predicted PNB by 97.25% of the participants. In panel B, truth-telling was predicted as the modal response to the PNB question for the cheating task by 78.90% of participants. In Panel C, for the case of JoD, the two modal normative expectations are non burning unconditionally (45.87%) and tit-for-tat (44.04%).[3] In Panel D, the modal normative expectation of cooperation is tit-for-tat (42.20%). The social norms for trust and trustworthiness will be discussed in Section 8.

Once illustrated the social norms that apply to the settings, we move to the assessment of the predictions. We will now present three different experiments.

4 Experiment I

4.1 Experimental Design and Procedures

Experiment I is a standard between-subject design, with a treatment and a control condition. In the treatment condition, participants suffered an NES. The NES was an 80% loss on the accumulated earning from a Real Effort Task (RET), experienced with a 50% probability. The

[3] This suggests that for almost half the participants, our prediction is valid. Moreover, when the social norm is to abstain, shocks do not affect behavior (as we should expect zero burning) thus the general prediction is unaffected.



Figure 2: The elicited normative expectations



Figure 3: The timeline of Experiment I

probability was common information. The RET was the Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)'s task of summing sequences of two-digit numbers and took place over 4 minutes. The assignment to the experimental conditions occurred at the individual level, within each session.

After the treatment, the participants played the stealing task and the JoD (Abbink and Herrmann 2011) in random order. In the JoD, participants can burn half of the endowment of the counterpart at their own cost. The decision is simultaneous. The initial endowment is 10 ECUs and the cost of burning is 1 ECU. To avoid a positive endowment shock after the NES, the assignment of the 10 ECU preceded the RET. We elicit beliefs on whether the counterpart was affected by shock and whether the counterpart was going to burn. To reduce the likelihood of hedging (Blanco et al., 2010), incentives for beliefs were smaller (1 ECU if correct). In the Stealing task, participants can appropriate 80% of the earnings from the RET, from a participant to another experiment occurring simultaneously.

This is how incentives were determined. Participants received the show up fee and the gain from the RET immediately after the session's end. The money from one randomly selected task among the other two (and the beliefs) was paid one week later.

We could not allow stealing within the session, as this was instrumental to manipulate intentional shocks in another experiment (Section VIII). Additionally, two antisocial tasks with counterparts within the same session could generate compensatory behavior. To avoid asymmetry in the JoD and the Stealing incentives, we decided to pay both tasks with a delay.

The timeline of the experiment is reported in Figure 3. The procedures were as follows. After reading the general instructions aloud, we asked participants to follow the specific instructions on the computer screen for each task. Subjects could raise their hand at any time if they had any questions. A final questionnaire was handed out to the participants.

In total, we recruited 184 undergraduate students from the Unbiased subject pool. Invitations were randomized. Sessions took place in the lab, in presence, around October 2019.

Out of the 184 participants, 92 were in the NES condition and 92 in the control. The average session had 20 participants and there were nine sessions in total. The exchange rates were 1000 COP per ECU. On average each participant earned 17000 ($\pm$5200) COP (approximately USD 5). The experiment is programmed in oTree (Chen et al., 2016) and the English version of the



Figure 4: The impact of NES in the Stealing and JoD tasks

protocol is available in the SOM, Section II.

4.2 Results

Participants, on average, solved 5.21 ($\pm$2.44) problems, and the performance is not different across experimental conditions ($\chi^2 = 9.18$, $p = 0.75$).

In Figure 4 (left panel), we report the average stealing rate by condition, with a 95% confidence interval. On average, stealing increases from 62% to 73.9% in presence of an NES. To assess the prediction, we run an OLS regression, controlling for order and compute a one sided test, since we are postulating a direction for the alternative hypothesis. Table 2, Column (1), reports the results. The effect is both economically relevant, around 25% of a standard deviation of the outcome in the control condition, and statistically significant ($F(1, 181) = 3.07$, $p = 0.04$ one-sided).

The behavior in the JoD is shown in Figure 4 (right panel). Participants burn 4.91% of the time when they believe that the counterpart will not burn, and 54.38% when they expect others to do it. This stylized fact documents the social norm of retaliation plotted in Figure 2. However, under the shock, the likelihood to retaliate is only 33.33%, i.e. there is a 21.50% reduction, which is both economically relevant (51.85% of a sd computed for the control condition) and statistically significant ($F(1, 179) = 2.44$, $p = 0.05$ one-sided).

Table 2: OLS estimates of effect of NES on Stealing and JoD

	(1) Stealing	**(2) JoD**
NES	0.063*	
	(0.036)	
Order	0.113	0.073
	(0.071)	(0.052)
NES-B(D)=0		0.080
		(0.049)
C-B(D)=1		0.486***
		(0.096)
NES-B(D)=1		0.277***
		(0.102)
Constant	0.544***	0.011
	(0.066)	(0.037)
N	184	184
Test of Prediction	0.04	0.06

Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The supporting regression is reported in Table 2, Column (2). We run an OLS regressions with three dummies: NES and $B(D) = 0$, control and $B(D) = 1$, and NES and $B(D) = 1$. The omitted category is control and $B(D) = 0$. In the last row, we report the p-value of the main test.

To summarize, as predicted, we detected a positive effect of NES on stealing and a negative effect of NES on retaliation.

5 Experiment II

5.1 Experimental Design and Procedures

Experiment II is a between subject design, with two conditions and with the treatment assigned at the individual level. In the treatment, we manipulated a random shock of 80% of the accumulated earnings from a RET, with a 50% chance. Since this is an online experiment, because of the Covid-19 pandemic, we did not use the same task as in Experiment I, as we could not prevent participants from using a calculator. Instead, we chose a 4 minutes transcription task. The language used was the Tagalog (the text was the Theory of Moral Sentiments; Smith 1759). We avoid more common languages to ensure that performance depends on effort and not on accumulated knowledge. Each fragment was 35 characters long. The software did not allow copy and paste.



Figure 5: The timeline of Experiment II

After the RET and the assignment to the experimental conditions, the main task was a "cheating game" based on Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013)'s die-under-the-cup. In this task, participants rolled a dice privately and reported their results. Participants had access to an online dice, beyond the experimenters' control, but they could use any available dice. The payoff was calculated as 2000 COP times the reported number (from one to five) and zero for a reported six. After the second task, participants had to answer some demographic questions.

This experiment was conducted online. We sent random invitations to a sample from the Unbiased subject pool, excluding those that took part in previous experiments with NES. We sent out a link for participation, with included instructions. The timeline is depicted in Figure 5.

Participants received a show up fee, the earnings from the RET and the dice. In total, we recruited 158 participants. Data collection occurred in June 2020, on average each participant earned around 25000 COP (around 7 USD).

The experiments is programmed with oTree (Chen et al., 2016). The experimental protocol can be found in the SOM, Section III.

5.2 Results

On average, participants tried 11.91 ± 3.78 transcriptions, completing successfully 9.17 ± 4.15 of them. There is no difference between treatment and control ($\chi^2 = 23.13$, $p = 0.23$ and $\chi^2 = 26.20$, $p = 0.19$ respectively).

There was a considerable amount of cheating: we neatly reject the null hypothesis that the observed data comes from a fair dice ($\chi^2 = 37.11$, $p < 0.001$).

Since we do not observe the original draws, we cannot test for cheating directly, but we can measure how the likelihood of reporting the numbers with the highest payoff (four or five) differs between treatment and control, as in Bogliacino and Montealegre (2020).



Figure 6: The impact of NES in the die-under-the-cup task

Figure 6 shows the mean outcome, broken down by experimental condition. In the control, the likelihood of reporting 4 or 5 is 45.78%. It increases to 60% in presence of a NES. The difference is as large as 28.36% of a sd of the outcome in the control condition and is statistically significant ($t = -1.79$, $p = 0.03$ one sided, controlling for unequal variance).

6 Experiment III

6.1 Experimental Design and Procedures

In Experiment III, we test the effect of shocks on cooperation. This is an online experiment with a treatment and control between-subject design. In the first part, participants performed a RET (transcription task as in Experiment II). After knowing their performance, they either kept all the money (control) or suffered an 80% loss (NES). To avoid deception but allows for a surprise effect, in explaining the incentives for the RET, we warned that in the second part of the task, the total payment could change. The surprise effect is the first design change with respect to the previous two experiments.

Table 3 show the normal form of the PD. The strategies C and NC were labelled green and blue. The second innovation with respect to the standard design consisted in the introduction of the this procedure: a) participants declared their strategy conditional on the belief that the counterpart was playing C and NC; b) then they declare which scenario was more likely among

1/2	C	NC
C	8, 8	0, 10
NC	10, 0	4, 4

Table 3: Experiment III: the stage game

the counterpart playing C, NC, or choosing randomly. Subjects knew that the answer was incentive compatible. Eliciting the belief contingent decisions represents the cleanest test of our prediction, and overcomes the endogeneity of the belief.

Since we asked four comprehension questions with feedback, we exclude those that made more than one mistake. The total number of observation is 297, of which 146 in the control and 151 in the NES condition. Data collection took place in March-April 2022 (PreAnalysis Plan recorded as AsPredicted #89448).

We recruited participants via the REBEL Lab at Universidad del Rosario. Participants are invite using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The protocol is programmed in oTree Chen et al. 2016 and can be found in the SOM-Section IV.

6.2 Results

On average, participants completed successfully 8.88±4.02 transcriptions. There is no difference between treatment and control ($\chi^2 = 25.18$, $p = 0.12$).

These are the main results. Under the belief that the counterpart would not cooperate, participants chose cooperation 9.58% of the time. The shock marginally decreased cooperation to 9.27%. The difference was not statistically significant ($F(1, 295) = 0.01$, $p = 0.46$ one sided). Under the belief that the counterpart would cooperate, participants chose cooperation 59.58% of the time. The shock increased defection and lower cooperation to 52.98%. The difference is not statistically significant ($F(1, 295) = 1.32$, $p = 0.12$ one sided) and represents around 15% of a sd in the control.

To wrap up, there is a marginal reduction in cooperation due to NES, but the effect is not statistically significant at the conventional level. We suspect that there may be an issue of power.



Figure 7: The impact of NES in the Prisoners' Dilemma

7 Experiment IV: Evidence from Rule Following

Across three different experiments, NES induce more norm violations. The evidence is robust for anti-social tasks and less so for the prisoner's dilemma. To provide a more conclusive test, we designed an additional experiment. This experiment improves on the previous design in three ways: a) it separately controls for a wealth effect, b) it induces the rule to follow instead of relying on elicited social norm, c) it allows for an intensive margin to increase statistical power.

The main task is the Rule Following Task (Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2018). Participants faced a RET under four possible conditions: (1) each correct transcription is paid one point, the potential 80% loss is announced but not administered (Control); (2) each correct transcription is paid one point, the potential shock is announced and administered (Shock treatment); (3) each correct transcription is paid one point (High treatment) and there is no exposure to shock; (4) each correct transcription is paid 0.2 points (Low treatment) and there is no exposure to shock. Treatments (1) and (2) followed the procedures in Experiment III: the first part was described as having two phases, where the payment could change between phases one and two. In the second part, participants should guide a stick man across a path with five traffic lights. Endowed with 30 seconds, each second worth one point, they were paid for the seconds left when they reached the end of the path. The rule announced to participants but not enforced was to wait for the green at each traffic light. It took five seconds for a traffic light to change from red to green.



Figure 8: Results from the rule following task

This is a between-subject incentivized survey. Random invitations were sent to those participants in our database that did not participate in any other experiment with shocks. The analysis was pre-registered (Aspredicted #80601).[4] We paid both tasks and a show-up fee.

These are the results. The performance in the RET was different across treatments, as expected given the differences in incentives ($\chi^2 = 74.81$, $p = 0.09$). The main outcome variable was the number of seconds spent crossing the path. On average, subjects spent 5.92 seconds (4.80 sd). In the control, the outcome was 7.51 ($\pm$6.80). In treatment (2) (the NES condition in Experiment I-III) the outcome was 4.95 ($\pm$2.73). A (one sided) t-test controlling for unequal variance returns $t = 2.46$ (one sided $p < 0.01$). In treatment (3), the outcome was 5.89 ($\pm$4.34), whereas in treatment (4) it was 5.43 ($\pm$4.28). A t-test controlling for unequal variance returns $t = 0.55$ (one sided $p = 0.29$). In other words, the wealth effect did not generate the same result as the shock. Results are plotted in Figure 8.

We run an OLS regression using the seconds as the outcome variable, with robust standard errors. The difference between the shock effect (dummy for treatment 2) and the wealth effect (the difference in performance between treatment 3 and 4) is 2.94 seconds and is statistically significant ($t = -2.27$, $p = 0.02$).

[4] Notice that we expected to reach 300 participants, but due to the end of the term and the fact that we could not use participants from other experiments we had to close the data collection at 210 participants. However the variability is much lower than expected.

8 Experiment V: Trust Game and Intentional Shocks

Most of the studies claiming an increase in prosociality following shocks elicit behaviour in a trust game. Field studies leverage framed shocks, such as traumatic events. The argument that exposure to shocks or scarcity leads to tighter cultures, where stronger norms apply are largely pointing at the role of these traumatic shocks (Gelfand, 2012; Gelfand et al., 2017; Prediger et al., 2014). The same holds for showing that violence leads to more prosocial behavior (Bogliacino et al., 2020; Bauer et al., 2016).

This is different from what we infer from our theoretical analysis. As we explained in Section 2, our main proposition can be derived under the existence of a trade-off between incentives and compliance. The trust decision does not include such trade-off, when the social norm is tit-for-tat. Tit-for-tat and self-interest recommend the same thing: trust if the second mover will share and do not trust otherwise. In this case, the NES does not alter the behaviour in equilibrium.

On the contrary, the trade off exists for the second mover. Since the social norm is $n = 0$, the DM will keep if $B(e) = u(e + w(1)) - u(e + w(0)) \geqslant c(\theta)$, and since $w(1) > w(0)$, and $B'(e) < 0$, this is equivalent to the analysis of the stealing and cheating tasks. Define $\bar{\theta}_{SM}$, the value of θ for the second mover, which is indifferent between sharing or keeping. $F_{SM}(\bar{\theta}_{SM})$ is the share of untrustworthy SMs.

Assuming tit-for-tat and trustworthiness is supported by data. Figure 9 plots the normative expectations for the trust game collected with the BX protocol described in Section II. The modal response in the NE question is conditional trust (66.97% of participants, Panel A). For trustworthiness, 85.32% of participants indicate sharing back (Panel B).

In the field, the shock is typically framed. Suffering a violent act implies realizing that someone intentionally caused a loss. We build on this intuition to design a lab experiment that manipulates intentional shocks, similar to those studied in natural settings. We expect in group bias to be salient, when the shock is intentional, and based on Gelfand et al. (2017), that subject become much more sensible to norm violation, in this case, reacting strongly to lack of trustworthiness.



Figure 9: Normative expectations in the trust game



Figure 10: The timeline of Experiment V

In this section, we will manipulate both random shocks and intentional shocks (mimicking violence) before eliciting the behavior in a standard TG.

8.1 Experimental Design and Procedures

Experiment V had a 3x1 between-subject design. Part I includes a RET and the shocks. Part II includes a trust game with role switching and elicitation of beliefs. The timeline is illustrated in Figure 10.

The RET in Part I is a Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)'s task, as in Experiment I. In fact, these sessions were run in parallel to the latter. After receiving their earnings from the RET, participants faced a random negative loss of 80% (rNES), or were matched with a participant in Experiment I who decided intentionally to steal 80% of the earnings (iNES), or received no shock (C). This information was common knowledge: the initial instructions included examples and images to ensure full awareness of the nature of the shock.



Figure 11: Trustworthiness: iNES and rNES

We used Bogliacino et al. (2018)'s version of the trust game (Berg et al., 1995). Participants received two ECUs each. The trustor decided whether to send zero, one or two tokens to the trustee, with the standard multiplier (3). Then the trustee decided whether to share (ending with equal payoffs) or not, using the strategy method. We adopted a neutral framing.

The elicitation of beliefs followed the standard procedures in Experiments I-II. Participants guessed whether the counterpart had been shocked and what decisions she took. One belief was randomly selected for payment and paid with one ECU if correct.

We run 19 sessions, in parallel with Experiment I, sending random invitations to the Unbiased subject pool. The average session had 14 observations, with minimal variation. We collected 261 data points. We had 80 observations in C, 85 in the rNES, and 96 in the iNES. Incentives included the earnings from the RET, one decision in the trust game, and a belief. The average payment was around 16000 COP. Participants solved on average 5.32 ± 2.12 additions. There were no differences across treatments ($\chi^2 = 17.38$, $p = 0.74$).

8.2 Results: Trustworthiness

Figure 11 plots the two trustworthiness decisions broken down by experimental condition.

On average, subjects shared 71.25% of the time when one ECU was sent in the control condition. This likelihood decreased to 57.64% in presence of a rNES. This difference is statistically significant (t-test controlling for unequal variance, $t = 1.83$, one sided $p = 0.03$).

The difference is softened when the shock is intentional, as the likelihood decreased to 66.66% ($t = 0.65$, $p = 0.25$). The difference between the two shocks is not statistically significant ($t = -1.24$, two sided $p = 0.21$).

The other trustworthiness decision was not different across conditions, but followed a similar pattern. The likelihood to share was 76.25% in the C, 74.11% in the rNES ($t = 0.31$, $p = 0.37$), and 76.04% in the iNES ($t = 0.03$, $p = 0.48$). The difference between shocks was not statistically significant ($t = -0.29$, $p = 0.76$).

At least for one of the trustworthiness decisions, data support our prediction.

To shed further light on the role of intentional shocks, we condition on the belief that the counterpart has been shocked. When the trustee believed that the counterpart did not suffer the shock, she shared in the case of one ECU 76.74% of the time. This likelihood decreased to 47.38% for rNES, and to 50% for iNES.

However, conditional on the belief that the counterpart suffered the shock, participants shared 64.86% of the times, i.e. a decrease of more than 10pp, in the control. In rNES, the share increased to 60.60% and in iNES, up to 69.51%.

Table 4: OLS estimates of effect of rNES and iNES on Trustworthiness

	(1) Tw(1T)	**(1) Tw(2T)**
iNES-B(S)=1	-0.072	0.060
	(0.083)	(0.083)
rNES-B(S)=1	-0.161*	0.021
	(0.089)	(0.088)
C-B(S)=1	-0.119	0.090
	(0.103)	(0.095)
iNES-B(S)=0	-0.267*	-0.078
	(0.150)	(0.147)
rNES-B(S)=0	-0.294**	0.016
	(0.133)	(0.123)
Constant	0.767***	0.721***
	(0.065)	(0.069)
N	261	261

Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

To understand these results, consider the regression in Table 4, column (1). Define $B(S)$ the indicator function for the belief over the the shock of the counterpart: $B(S) = 1$ when expecting to interact with a victim. Participants are divided into the following groups: $C - B(S) = 0$, $rNEs - B(S) = 0$, $iNEs - B(S) = 0$, $C - B(S) = 1$, $rNEs - B(S) = 1$, $iNEs - B(S) = 1$. We added five dummies, leaving the $C - B(S) = 0$ as the omitted category, captured by the constant.

The effect of intentional shock on trust towards a victim, with respect to the effect of the shock towards a non exposed is 31.39% and it is marginally significant ($F(1, 255) = 3.13$, $p = 0.07$). Victims of intentional shock are 6.27% more trusting than in case of random shocks ($F(1, 255) = 0.10$, $p = 0.74$).

The other trustworthiness decision tells a similar story but with less pronounced differences (see Column 2 of Table 4). On average, trustworthiness was 72.09% in the control and conditional on the belief that the counterpart was not shocked. This increased by 1.59% to 74.68% in presence of a rNES and decreased by 7.8% to 64.28% in presence of an iNES.

Towards a victim, trustworthiness increased to 81.08% in the control, to 74.24% in presence of an rNES and 78.04% in presence of an iNES.

The difference in difference is not statistically significant i.e. 4.77% ($F(1, 255) = 0.08$, $p = 0.77$), and the intentional shock would be 13.20% larger than the random shock ($F(1, 255) = 0.54$, $p = 0.46$).

Summing up, exposure to intentional shock seems to bias towards the in-group: victims of intentional shocks tend to treat more favorably those that went through the same experience than those who did not. Data from this controlled environment suggest that the estimated coefficient in a field study reflects this in-group bias and inflates prosociality with respect to the pure random shock.

8.3 Results: Trust

The outcome variable is the amount of tokens sent divided by two, i.e. the intensive margin. Since we elicited the two beliefs over trustworthiness, we normalized them and created an indicator variable equal to one if trustworthiness is expected in either of the two scenarios. Similarly to the previous subsection, we created an indicator variable equal to one if the sender expected the receiver to be victim of shock.

Figure 12 plots trust broken down by experimental condition and belief over trustworthiness. Figure 13 plots trust broken down by experimental condition and belief over whether the receiver was shocked.

On average, the trust was 50.00% in the control towards the non trustworthy, it is slightly higher in presence of a rNES (55.26%, $t = -0.36$, controlling for unequal variance, one sided $p = 0.64$), and instead lower in presence of an iNES, where it drops to 26.66% ($t = 1.60$, $p = 0.05$). The difference between the two shocks is statistically significant ($t = 2.14$, two sided $p = 0.04$).

Trust towards the trustworthy was 59.23% in the control, 67.42% in the rNES condition ($t = -1.62$, $p = 0.10$ two sided), and 61.11% in the iNES ($t = -0.37$, $p = 0.70$). The difference between the two shocks was not statistically significant ($t = 1.29$, two sided $p = 0.19$).

As predicted, random shocks do not affect behavior in a trust game. Although absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, this is consistent with our model. Moreover, as predicted, intentional shock make people more "tight", punishing non trustworthy receivers.

We now consider both the belief that the counterpart had been shocked. Participants sent 54.65% in the control towards the non victim, increasing in presence of a rNES (68.42%, $t = -1.46$, controlling for unequal variance, two sided $p = 0.15$), and instead lower in presence of an iNES, where it drops to 46.42% ($t = 0.74$, $p = 0.46$). The difference between the two shocks is marginally significant ($t = 1.75$, $p = 0.09$).

Trust towards the trustworthy increases to 60.81% in the control and the effect of the victim is around 6 pp ($t = -0.86, p = 0.38$), it decreases to 63.63% in the rNES condition with a 4pp effect of the victim ($t = 0.54, p = 0.58$), and increases to 57.31% in the iNES, with an 11 pp increase ($t = -1.04$, $p = 0.31$). The differences are not statistically significant.

In other words, although inconclusive, exposure to iNES appears to be sensible to the victim identity. Also, there seems to be more willingness to punish non trustworthy. Further evidence is needed but this results are consistent with the theory of norm compliance and with the argument by evolutionary psychology that traumatic events lead to tighter culture.



Figure 12: Trust: iNES and rNES



Figure 13: Trust: iNES and rNES

9 Concluding remarks

This article shows how experiencing wealth losses can be a source of norm violation. Although studies on crime against property have documented this objective fact, the literature failed to grasp the underlying mechanism and its implications for our theories of strategic behavior.

Since norms are scripts that humans partially incorporate into their preferences (Gintis, 2007), it is not surprising that people manipulate or elude norms if allowed to do so (Bicchieri et al., 2021; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Bicchieri, 2010). Dictator games are widely used in this literature to avoid confounds from strategic beliefs. Dana et al. (2007) introduce the concept of *moral wiggle room* to explain why when settings change, but the action space does not, subjects behave more egoistically. List (2007) documents a sizable behavioral change following minimal variation in the action space. Instead of relying on contextual changes, we provide evidence from indirect incentive effects.

The literature on shocks is now rapidly expanding. In experimental settings, the manipulation of losses or windfalls has been used to study poverty or scarcity, usually exploiting paycheck variation or natural experiments. This literature focused on the cognitive impact: Mani et al. (2013) found a negative effect in sugarcane farmers in India [5] while Bogliacino and Montealegre (2020) found a negative effect of NES on cognitive performance in the lab. Haushofer and Fehr (2014) claim that suffering NES (and in general, poverty) increases stress, which induces lower risk propensity (in the gain domain) and higher present bias, further worsening the cognitive performance in decision tasks. The impact on social norms has been overlooked, though, although .

This article has implications for the ongoing discussion on global challenges such as pandemics, global warming, and war threats. Theories of cultural evolution suggest that the western culture evolved through a peculiar *W.E.I.R.D.* [6] psychology and social norms, forged in response to the Marriage and Family Program of the Church (Heinrich, 2020). If vulnerability to shocks can drive the abandonment of norms and the establishment of new rules of behavior, the heterogeneity of such vulnerability has important implications for the evolution of cultural norms.

[5] Carvalho et al. (2016) found no effect, but paycheck variations are temporary, expected and expected to be temporary.

[6] Acronym of Western, Educated and from an Industrialized, Rich, and Developed country. It has been coined by Heinrich et al. (2010).

But, as we stated in the final part, shocks should be understood according to their source and (possibly) individual versus collective nature. This article is but a beginning of this theory.

Finally, this article has implications for the discussion around welfare state protection or liberalization in general. Market *disciplines*, but downward adjustment of price and earnings may lead to unintended consequences (Dix-Carneiro et al., 2018). Recent evidence from the Uk confirmed that this may be the case (d'Este and Harvey, 2022).

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A Theoretical Predictions

For the cheating and stealing tasks, in equilibrium there will be a $\bar{\theta}$, defined by $u(e+w(1))-u(e+w(0)) = c(\bar{\theta})$ such that a share $F(\bar{\theta})$ will choose $d = 1$. Define $B(e) = u(e+w(1)) - u(e+w(0))$, by Assumption 1, $B'(e) < 0$, implying that an NES shifts $\bar{\theta}$ to the right.

This is our first prediction:

Prediction 1. *In the cheating and stealing tasks:*

- $\frac{\partial P(d=1)}{\partial e} < 0$

The JoD game introduces strategic considerations. The social norm is $n = d_j$. The payoffs are $w(0,0) > w(1,0) > w(0,1) > w(1,1)$. Define p to be the expected likelihood of $d_j = 1$. The agent chooses $d = 1$ if $pu(e+w(1,1)) + (1-p)(u(e+w(1,0)) - c(\theta)) \geqslant p(u(e+w(0,1)) - c(\theta)) + (1-p)u(e+w(0,0))$.

If $p = 0$ then $u(e+w(1,0)) - u(e+w(0,0)) < c(\theta)$, which implies $d = 0$ and no effect of NES. If $p = 1$, the DM will choose d=1 if $c(\theta) \geq (u(e+w(0,1)) - u(e+w(1,1))$, i.e. if the cost of transgression is larger than the cost of retaliation. The latter is increasing in the endowment by Assumption 1, implying a rightward shift of $\bar{\theta}$ as a result of a NES.

This is our second testable prediction, which applies to the JoD:

Prediction 2. *In the JoD task:*

- $\frac{\partial P(d=1|p=1)}{\partial e} > 0$

Consider now the pro-social tasks, starting from the the trust game. Recall first that the decision is dychotomous for both the first (FM) and second mover (SM), and, second, that $d = 1$ is the harmful action. In other words, for both FM and SM, $d = 1$ is to keep.

The analysis of the SM is straightforward. Since the social norm is $n = 0$, the DM will keep if $B(e) = u(e+w(1)) - u(e+w(0)) \geqslant c(\theta)$, and since $w(1) > w(0)$, and $B'(e) < 0$, this is equivalent to the analysis of the stealing and cheating tasks. Define $\bar{\theta}_{SM}$, the value of θ for the second mover, which is indifferent between sharing or keeping. $F_{SM}(\bar{\theta}_{SM})$ is the share of untrustworthy SMs.

The problem for the first mover under tit-for-tat is $p(u(e+w(1,1)) - u(e+w(0,1))) + (1-p)(u(e+w(1,0)) - u(e+w(0,0)))) \geq (1-2p)c(\theta)$. Analyzing separately for $p = 0$ and $p = 1$, we can notice that $u(e+w(1,1)) - u(e+w(0,1)) > 0$ and $u(e+w(1,0)) - u(e+w(0,0)) < 0$. In other words, there is no cost of retaliation and no advantage of defection. Conditional on $p = 0$ ($p = 1$), the incentives and the norm prescribe to trust (not to trust). As a result, in this case, there is no effect of shock.

However in this sequential game, also the $n = 0$ norm applies.

The FM decides to keep if $B(e) = p(u(e+w(1,1)) - u(e+w(0,1))) + (1-p)(u(e+w(1,0)) - u(e+w(0,0)))) \geq c(\theta)$. By simple algebra $p = 1 \rightarrow B(e) > 0$ and $p = 0 \rightarrow B(e) < 0$. This implies that, conditional on $p = 1$, since $B'(e) < 0$, the $\bar{\theta}$ shifts to the right, while, conditional on $p = 0$ there is no effect of shock, because of the TG assumption.

Summarizing, for the TG, the predictions are:

Prediction 3. *In the trust game:*

- $\frac{\partial P(d_{SM}=1)}{\partial e} < 0$

- $\frac{\partial P(d_{FM}=1|p=1)}{\partial e} < 0$ *under* $n = 0$

Finally, we analyze the prisoner's dilemma game (PD). In this case $d = 1$ is No Cooperation.

We first derive the prediction for the case in which the social norm is to be a conditional cooperator ($n = d_j$). In this case, Player i will confess if $p(u(e + w(1,1)) - u(e + w(0,1))) + (1 - p)(u(e + w(1,0)) - u(e + w(0,0))) \geqslant (1 - 2p)c(\theta)$. Define $B(e) = p(u(e + w(1,1)) - u(e + w(0,1))) + (1 - p)(u(e + w(1,0)) - u(e + w(0,0)))$.

If $p = 0$, then $B(e) > 0$ and $B'(e) < 0$. In other words, an NES decreases cooperation. On the other hand, if $p = 1$, then there is no effect of shock because $B(e) > -c(\theta)$. That is, choosing $d = 1$ always gives a benefit grater than the cost.

For the norm of unconditional cooperation, $n = 0$, $p(u(e+w(1,1))-u(e+w(0,1)))+(1-p)(u(e+w(1,0)) - u(e + w(0,0))) \geqslant c(\theta)$ and under both $p = 0$ and $p = 1$, $B(e) = (u(e + w(1,1)) - u(e + w(0,1))) > 0$ and $B'(e) < 0$. This implies that $\frac{\partial P(d=1|p=1)}{\partial e} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial P(d=1|p=0)}{\partial e} < 0$.

Prediction 4. *In the prisoner's dilemma game:*

- $\frac{\partial P(d=1|p=0)}{\partial e} < 0$ *under the norm* $n = d_j$ *and* $n = 0$
- $\frac{\partial P(d=1|p=1)}{\partial e} < 0$ *under the norm* $n = 0$

B Proof of Proposition 1

Consider first the Prisoner's Dilemma. Notice that in an equilibrium, a DM chooses $d = 1$ iif $p(u(e+w(1,1))-u(e+w(0,1)))+(1-p)(u(e+w(1,0))-u(e+w(0,0)))) \geq (1-2n)c(\theta)$. Given the payoff of the PD, $p(u(e+w(1,1))-u(e+w(0,1)))+(1-p)(u(e+w(1,0))-u(e+w(0,0)))) > 0$. If $n = 0$ (norm of unconditional cooperation), $\exists\bar{\theta}$ such that $\forall\theta \in [0, \bar{\theta}]$, $d = 1$. In equilibrium, it must be that $p = F(\bar{\theta})$, thus $F(\bar{\theta})(u(e + w(1,1)) - u(e + w(0,1))) + (1 - F(\bar{\theta}))(u(e + w(1,0)) - u(e + w(0,0)))) - c(\bar{\theta}) = 0$. Define the equilibrium indifference condition for $\bar{\theta}$ as $\Phi(\bar{\theta}) = F(\bar{\theta})(u(e + w(1,1)) - u(e + w(0,1))) + (1 - F(\bar{\theta}))(u(e + w(1,0)) - u(e + w(0,0)))) - c(\bar{\theta}) = 0$.

Using Assumption 2, a single crossing property holds between the cost ($c(\theta)$) and benefit $F(\bar{\theta})(u(e+w(1,1)) - u(e+w(0,1))) + (1 - F(\bar{\theta}))(u(e+w(1,0)) - u(e+w(0,0)))))$ of deviation, and the benefit crosses the cost curve from above, i.e. $\frac{\partial\Phi(\bar{\theta})}{\partial\theta} < 0$. By Assumption 1, $\frac{\partial\Phi(\bar{\theta})}{\partial e} < 0$. Implicitly differentiating the equilibrium indifference conditions, gives $\frac{\partial\bar{\theta}}{\partial e} = -\frac{\frac{\partial\Phi(\bar{\theta})}{\partial e}}{\frac{\partial\Phi(\bar{\theta})}{\partial\theta}} < 0$, i.e a NES increases norm violation.

If the norm is $n = d_j$, the cost curve $(1 - 2F(\theta))c(\theta)$ has a zero in 0 and in 1/2, and it is first increasing then decreasing. This implies that there is more than one equilibrium, but only one is stable. In the stable equilibrium, $\frac{\partial\Phi(\bar{\theta})}{\partial\theta} < 0$ and the same comparative statics holds.

For the JoD, in equilibrium, a DM chooses $d = 1$ iif $p(u(e+w(1,1))-u(e+w(0,1)))+(1-p)(u(e+w(1,0)) - u(e + w(0,0)))) \geq (1 - 2p)c(\theta)$, where we use the social norm of retaliation. Since $p(u(e+w(1,1))-u(e+w(0,1)))+(1-p)(u(e+w(1,0))-u(e+w(0,0)))) < 0$, only high θ retaliate, i.e. by definition of equilibrium $p = 1 - F(\bar{\theta})$. The equilibrium indifference conditions becomes $(1-F(\bar{\theta}))(u(e+w(1,1))-u(e+w(0,1)))+F(\bar{\theta})(u(e+w(1,0))-u(e+w(0,0))))-(2F(\bar{\theta}))-1)c(\theta) = 0$. Notice that $\frac{\partial\Phi(\theta)}{\partial\theta} = -F'(\theta)\frac{\partial p(u(e+w(1,1))-u(e+w(0,1)))+(1-p)(u(e+w(1,0))-u(e+w(0,0))))-(1-2p)c(\theta)}{\partial p}$. For stability, we need $\frac{\partial p(u(e+w(1,1))-u(e+w(0,1)))+(1-p)(u(e+w(1,0))-u(e+w(0,0))))-(1-2p)c(\theta)}{\partial p} < 0$, thus $(1 - F(\bar{\theta}))(u(e + w(1,1)) - u(e + w(0,1))) + F(\bar{\theta})(u(e + w(1,0)) - u(e + w(0,0))))$ to cross

$(2F(\bar{\theta})) - 1)c(\theta)$ from below, i.e. $\frac{\partial \Phi(\bar{\theta})}{\partial \theta} > 0$. By Assumptions 1 and 2, $\frac{\partial \Phi(\bar{\theta})}{\partial e} > 0$, since $(1 - F(\bar{\theta}))(u(e + w(1,1)) - u(e + w(0,1))) + F(\bar{\theta})(u(e + w(1,0)) - u(e + w(0,0)))) < 0$, $\frac{\partial \bar{\theta}}{\partial e} = -\frac{\frac{\partial \Phi(\bar{\theta})}{\partial e}}{\frac{\partial \Phi(\bar{\theta})}{\partial \theta}} < 0$, i.e a NES increases norm violation and reduces the share of DM choosing $d = 1$.